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Immigration and the 
U.S. Labor Market
Philip L. Martin
University of California, Davis
On a typical day, about 100,000 foreigners arrive in the United 
States. Most are temporary migrants or visitors, including tourists, busi-
ness people, students, and workers, who are welcomed at airports and 
border crossings. About 2,600 are legal immigrants or refugees who 
have been invited to become permanent residents of the United States, 
94,000 are temporary visitors, and 3,200 are unauthorized foreigners, 
usually Mexicans, about half of whom are apprehended just inside the 
Mexico–U.S. border.
Vernon Briggs’s career has focused on low-wage U.S. workers. 
Briggs consistently urged enactment and enforcement of policies that 
would help low-wage workers to help themselves. The self-evident 
truth that “a tight labor market is a worker’s best friend” has been a cor-
nerstone of Briggs’s analysis of immigration policy, which stresses that 
periods of less immigration in U.S. history were associated with faster 
increases in wages for low-wage U.S. workers.
This chapter provides a global and national perspective on contem-
porary immigration patterns. It does not prescribe but aims to show 
the dimensions and impacts of migration. Among the topics covered 
are the factors contributing to international migration, government ef-
forts to manage immigration, trends in the types of migrants entering 
the United States, migration’s labor-market effects, and immigration 
policy trade-offs. The topics addressed are among those that fi gure most 
prominently in Briggs’s policy-oriented writings.
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GLOBAL MIGRATION
Migration is the movement of people from one place to another. 
Migration is as old as humankind wandering in search of food, but in-
ternational migration is a relatively recent development. It was only 
in the early twentieth century that the system of nation-states, pass-
ports, and visas developed to regulate the fl ow of people across borders 
(Torpey 1999).
International migration is the exception, not the rule. The most sig-
nifi cant form of migration control is inertia—most people do not want 
to move away from family and friends. The use of passports, visas, and 
border controls has also given modern governments signifi cant capacity 
to regulate migration, and they do. One item considered by many gov-
ernments when deciding whether to recognize a new entity that declares 
itself a nation-state is whether it is able to regulate who crosses and who 
remains within its borders.
There were 190 million international migrants in 2005, meaning 
that 3 percent of the world’s people left their country of birth or citi-
zenship for a year or more (Table 4.1). The number of international 
migrants increased by almost 4 million a year between 1995 and 2005, 
with almost all of the increase in high-income countries.
Most of the world’s 6.7 billion people never cross a national border; 
most live and die near their place of birth. Those who cross national 
borders usually move to nearby countries, such as from Mexico to the 
United States or from Turkey to Germany. There were 62 million mi-
grants from developing countries in industrial countries in 2005, but 
almost as many migrants, 61 million, had moved from one developing 
country to another, such as from Indonesia to Malaysia. There are also 
large fl ows of people from one industrial country to another, for ex-
Table 4.1  International Migrants in 2005 (millions)
Destination country
Origin country Industrial Developing
Industrial 53 14
Developing 62 61
SOURCE: United Nations Population Division (2006). 
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ample, from Canada to the United States, and much smaller fl ows from 
industrial to developing countries, such as Japanese who work or retire 
in Thailand (United Nations Population Division 2006).
PERSPECTIVES ON MIGRATION
International migration is likely to increase for reasons that range 
from persisting demographic and economic inequalities to improve-
ments in communications and transportation that increase mobility. 
There are also more borders to cross. There were 193 generally rec-
ognized nation-states in 2000, four times more than the 43 in 1900.1 
Each nation-state distinguishes citizens and foreigners, has border con-
trols to inspect those seeking entry, and determines what foreigners can 
do while inside the country, whether they are tourists, students, guest 
workers, or immigrants.
Most countries discourage immigration, meaning that they do not 
encourage foreigners to settle and become naturalized citizens. Some 
also discourage emigration; for example, Communist nations attempted 
to prevent emigration between 1961 and 1989, and North Korea contin-
ues to try to keep its citizens from leaving.
There are fi ve major countries that do plan for the arrival of im-
migrants: the United States, which accepted 1.2 million immigrants in 
2006; Canada (250,000); Australia (125,000); New Zealand (50,000); 
and Israel (25,000).2 The number of newcomers arriving in industrial 
countries exceeds the planned 1.6 million a year, suggesting that many 
of these newcomers are temporary visitors or unauthorized foreigners 
who fi nd ways to settle despite not arriving as immigrants.
Perspectives on the rising number of migrants can be framed by two 
extremes. At one extreme, the Wall Street Journal advocates a fi ve-word 
amendment to the U.S. constitution: “There shall be open borders.”3 Or-
ganizations ranging from the Catholic Church to the World Bank have 
called for more migration, arguing that people should not be confi ned 
to their countries of birth by national borders and that more migration 
would speed economic growth and development in both the sending 
and the receiving countries.
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At the other extreme, virtually every industrial country has orga-
nizations such as the U.S.-based Federation for American Immigration 
Reform (FAIR), which calls for sharp reductions in immigration on 
the grounds that unskilled newcomers hurt low-skilled U.S. workers, 
have negative environmental effects, and threaten established U.S. cul-
tural values. Many European countries have political parties that call 
for reducing immigration, such as the National Front in France, which 
proposed (during the 1995 presidential campaign) removing up to 3 
million non-Europeans from France to reduce the number of Muslim 
residents.4
The fi rst step toward making migration a manageable challenge is 
to understand why people migrate. Most people do not want to cross 
national borders to settle in another country, and, even though the num-
ber of migrants is at an all-time high, international migrants are (as 
mentioned above) just 3 percent of the world’s residents. Furthermore, 
economic growth can turn origination nations into destination nations, 
as has been seen recently in Ireland, Italy, and Korea. The challenge 
is to manage migration in a way that reduces the differences that en-
courage people to cross borders and to understand how investment, 
remittances, and aid can stimulate economic development and reduce 
migration pressures.
DIFFERENCES AND NETWORKS
Differences in demographic and economic conditions encourage 
people to cross national borders, and their movements have been eased 
by revolutions in communications, transportation, and rights.
Most of the world’s people and most of the population growth are 
in developing countries. The world’s population, which reached 6 bil-
lion in October 1999, is growing by 1.3 percent or 80 million a year, 
with 97 percent of the growth in developing countries.5 In the past, sig-
nifi cant demographic differences between areas prompted large-scale 
migration. For example, Europe had 21 percent of the world’s almost 
1 billion residents in 1800 and the Americas had only 4 percent (Table 
4.2). When there were fi ve Europeans for every American, millions of 
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Europeans emigrated to North and South America in search of eco-
nomic opportunity as well as religious and political freedom.
Will history repeat itself? Africa and Europe have roughly equal 
populations today, but by 2050, Africa is projected to have three times 
more residents. If Africa remains poorer than Europe, the two conti-
nents’ diverging demographic trajectories may propel young people 
from overcrowded cities such as Cairo and Lagos to move to Berlin 
and Rome.
The economic differences that encourage international migration 
have two dimensions, one fostered by inequality between countries and 
the other by inequality within. The world’s almost 200 nation-states 
have annual per-capita incomes that range from less than $250 per 
person to more than $50,000, a difference that provides a signifi cant 
incentive (especially for young people) to migrate for higher wages and 
more opportunities (World Bank 2009).6
The 30 highest income countries had a total of 1 billion residents 
in 2005, about one-sixth of the world’s population; their combined 
gross national income was $36 trillion, about 80 percent of the global 
$45 trillion.7 The resulting average per-capita income of $35,000 in 
high-income countries was 21 times the average of $1,750 in low- and 
middle-income countries. Despite rapid economic growth in some de-
veloping countries, including the East Asian “Tigers” in the 1990s and 
Table 4.2  World Population by Continent, 1800, 2000, and 2050 (percent 
shares)
1800 1999 2050a
World (millions) 978 5,978 8,909
Africa 11 13 20
Asia 65 61 59
Europe 21 12 7
South America, Latin America, and 
Caribbean 
3 9 9
North America 1 5 4
Oceania 0 1 1
NOTE: Columns may not total 100 due to rounding.
a Projected.
SOURCE: United Nations Population Division (1999, table 2). 
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China and India more recently, the ratio in per-capita incomes between 
high-income and other countries rose between 1975 and 2000 and 
shrank only marginally since 2000. In 2005, average per-capita income 
in high-income countries was 61 times higher than that in low-income 
countries and 13 times higher than that in middle-income countries 
(Table 4.3).
Another aspect of economic inequality between nation-states also 
adds to international migration pressures—international differences in 
labor force growth. The world’s labor force of 3.1 billion in 2005 in-
cluded 600 million workers in the high-income countries and 2.5 billion 
in the low-income countries. Almost all labor force growth is projected 
to be in lower income countries; their labor force is projected to in-
crease by about 425 million between 2005 and 2015, whereas the labor 
force in high-income countries is projected to remain stable at just over 
600 million (Table 4.4).
Internal inequality related to rural–urban migrations also can en-
courage international migration. In lower income countries, 40 percent 
of workers are employed in agriculture, a sector often heavily taxed 
despite the fact that farmers and farm workers usually have lower than 
average incomes.8 With taxes helping to keep farm incomes less than 
nonfarm incomes, there is often migration from rural areas to urban 
areas, one of the reasons why the urban share of the world’s population 
surpassed 50 percent for the fi rst time in 2008 (United Nations Popula-
tion Fund 2007).
Industrial countries had “Great Migrations” off the land, which 
provided workers for expanding factories, fueled population growth in 
cities, and added to emigration pressures. Similar Great Migrations are 
under way today in countries from China to Mexico, and this rural–urban
migration has three implications for international migration. First, 
ex-farmers and farm workers are most likely to accept 3-D (dirty, dan-
gerous, and diffi cult) jobs inside their countries or abroad (Martin and 
Midgley 2006).9 Second, rural–urban migrants often have to make cul-
tural as well as physical transitions, and many of them fi nd the transition 
is as easy abroad as at home; for example, rural Mexicans may fi nd it 
as easy to adapt to Los Angeles as to Mexico City. Third, domestic
rural–urban migrants get one step closer to a country’s exits because it 
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Table 4.3  Global Migrants and Per-Capita Income Gaps, 1975–2005
Countries grouped by 










(millions) Low Middle High High-low High-mid
1975 85 4.1 2.1 1 150 750 6,200 41 8
1985 105 4.8 2.2 2 270 1,290 11,810 44 9
1990 154 5.3 2.9 10 350 2,220 19,590 56 9
1995 164 5.7 2.9 2 430 2,390 24,930 58 10
2000 175 6.1 2.9 2 420 1,970 27,510 66 14
2005 191 6.4 3.0 3 580 2,640 35,131 61 13
NOTE: The 1990 migrant stock was raised from 120 million to 154 million, largely to refl ect the breakup of the USSR; 1975 income data 
are for 1976. 2005 data are gross national income.
SOURCE: United Nations Population Division and World Bank Development Indicators.
56Table 4.4  World, Developed Country, and Less Developed Country Economically Active Populations
(EAP), 1980–2020
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
World EAP 1,929,556 2,160,150 2,405,619 2,604,941 2,818,456 3,050,420 3,279,373 3,481,270 3,651,283
More dev. EAP 522,683 544,271 568,832 573,626 589,151 604,521 613,388 611,392 602,977
Less dev. EAP 1,406,873 1,615,879 1,836,787 2,031,315 2,229,305 2,445,899 2,665,986 2,869,878 3,048,307
Change (%) 1980–1990 1990–2000 2000–2010 2010–2020
World EAP 25 21 17 17
More dev. EAP 9 5 4 5
Less dev. EAP 31 26 21 20
SOURCE: International Labour Offi ce (2009).
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is usually easier to obtain visas and documents for legal migration—and 
to make arrangements for illegal migration—in the cities.
Differences encourage migration, but it takes networks or links 
between areas to encourage people to move. Migration networks are 
a broad concept, and they include communication factors that enable 
people to learn about opportunities abroad as well as the migration in-
frastructure that actually transports migrants over national borders and 
even the rights regime that allows them to remain abroad. Migration 
networks have been shaped and strengthened by revolutionary changes 
in each of these areas (communications, transportation, and rights) dur-
ing the past half-century.
Communications and Transportation
The communications revolution helps potential migrants to learn 
about opportunities abroad. The best information comes from migrants 
that are already established abroad because they can provide family 
and friends with information in an understandable context. Cheaper 
communications enable migrants to quickly transmit job information 
as well as advice on how to cross national borders to friends and rela-
tives at home. For example, information about vacant California farm 
jobs may be received in rural Mexico, thousands of miles away, be-
fore it spreads to nearby cities that have unemployment rates of over 
20 percent.10 Meanwhile, fi lms and television programs depicting life 
in high-income countries may encourage people (especially younger 
people) to assume that the grass is greener abroad and that migration 
will lead to economic betterment.11
The transportation revolution highlights the declining cost of 
travel. British migrants unable to pay one-way passage to North Amer-
ican colonies in the eighteenth century often indentured themselves, 
signing contracts that obliged them to work for three to six years for 
whoever met the ship and paid the captain. Transportation costs today 
are far less, typically less than $2,500 to travel anywhere in the world 
legally, and $1,000 to $20,000 for unauthorized migration. Most studies 
suggest faster payback times for migrants today, so that even migrants 
who pay high smuggling fees can usually repay them within two or 
three years.
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Managing Migration via Rights
The communications and transportation revolutions help migrants 
to learn about opportunities and to cross national borders, while the 
rights revolution affects their ability to stay abroad. After World War II, 
most industrial countries strengthened the constitutional and political 
rights of people within their borders to prevent a recurrence of fascism, 
and most granted social or economic rights to residents in their evolving 
welfare states without distinguishing citizens from migrants.
As migration increased in the 1990s, policymakers began to roll 
back certain rights, especially socioeconomic rights, for migrants in an 
effort to manage migration. For example, many European governments 
(Germany, for example) put liberal asylum provisions into their post-
war constitutions to avoid another situation similar to when refugees 
perished because other countries returned them to Nazi Germany. In 
the early 1990s, over 1,000 foreigners a day were applying for asylum 
in Germany. The government distributed them throughout the country 
and required local communities to provide them with housing and food. 
Because more than 90 percent of these were eventually found not to 
be in need of protection, there was a backlash that included attacks on 
foreigners.
The German government responded in three ways: 1) it required 
nationals of the countries of origin of asylum seekers (such as Turkey) 
to obtain visas, allowing pre-screening; 2) it imposed fi nes on airlines 
bringing foreigners to Germany without visas and other documents; 
and 3) it and other European Union countries agreed to make it diffi -
cult for foreigners from “safe” countries (or who transited through safe 
countries en route to Germany) to apply for asylum.12 In this way, the 
constitutional protection of asylum was maintained, but by making it 
harder to apply, they reduced the number of applicants.
In the 1990s, the United States debated the cost of providing wel-
fare or social assistance to legal and unauthorized migrants. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement was expected to speed up econom-
ic and job growth in Mexico, reducing migration between the United 
States and Mexico. Instead, Mexico–U.S. migration surged during the 
U.S. recession of 1991–1992, prompting California voters to approve 
Proposition 187 in 1994 over the objections of almost all statewide 
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political and opinion leaders (Migration News 1994). The proposition 
called for establishment of a state-funded screening mechanism to en-
sure that unauthorized foreigners did not obtain state-funded services, 
including public-school education.13
Proposition 187 led to a national debate over immigrant numbers 
and rights, especially about the access of newcomers to social assis-
tance. President Bill Clinton and those who wanted to “end welfare 
as we know it” argued that the number of needy migrants should be 
reduced to ensure continued access to welfare benefi ts among legal 
immigrants. However, employers argued that the better solution was 
to allow immigration to remain at high levels and reduce their access 
to social assistance. Employers won—immigration remained high and 
welfare benefi ts were curbed, but benefi ts to poor children and el-
derly immigrants were restored during the economic boom of the late 
1990s.14
Balancing migrant numbers and migrant rights is a major challenge. 
Countries with the highest shares of migrants in their labor forces, such 
as the Gulf oil exporters, tend to extend few rights to migrants—it is 
very hard for a guest worker to win immigrant status and naturalize in 
Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. Countries with fewer guest 
workers, such as Sweden and other Scandinavian countries, tend to 
grant more rights to foreigners. The numbers–rights trade-off is appar-
ent in World Trade Organization negotiations, where some developing 
countries argue that their migrant “service providers” should not have 
to earn the minimum wage in the destination country. Requiring pay-
ment of the minimum wage, they reason, will reduce the number of 
migrant workers employed (Ruhs and Martin 2008).
U.S. MIGRATION
The United States is a nation of immigrants. Under the motto “e 
pluribus unum” (from many one), U.S. presidents frequently remind 
Americans that, with a few exceptions, they or their forebears share the 
experience of beginning anew in the land of opportunity.15 Immigration 
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is widely considered to be in the national interest since it permits im-
migrants to better themselves and strengthen the United States.
For its fi rst 100 years, the United States facilitated immigration, 
welcoming foreigners to settle a vast country. Beginning in the 1880s, 
certain types of foreigners were barred, including prostitutes, workers 
who arrived with contracts that tied them to a particular employer for 
several years, and Chinese, beginning an era of qualitative restrictions. 
In the 1920s, quantitative restrictions or quotas set a ceiling on the num-
ber of immigrants accepted each year.
Amendments in 1965 switched preferences from those wishing 
to migrate from countries in northwestern Europe to those who had 
relatives in the United States and those desired by U.S. employers. The 
origins of immigrants were not expected to change, but they did. In 
the 1960s, half of U.S. immigrants were from Latin America and Asia; 
between 2000 and 2005, 73 percent were from these regions (Martin 
and Midgley 2006, p. 3). Illegal immigration began rising in the 1970s, 
rose faster after immigration reforms in 1986, and was the fi rst major 
immigration issue debated in Congress in the twenty-fi rst century, as 
exemplifi ed by debates in the Senate in 2006 and 2007 (Migration News 
2006, 2007a).
Immigration occurs in waves, and the United States is in the midst 
of its fourth wave of immigrants. The fi rst wave arrived before records 
were kept beginning in 1820, and most newcomers were from the British 
Isles. The second wave, dominated by Irish and German immigrants in 
the 1840s and 1850s, challenged the dominance of the Protestant church 
and led to a nativist backlash against Catholics and immigrants.
The third wave, between 1880 and 1914, brought more than 20 mil-
lion immigrants to the United States, an average of 650,000 a year. 
Most of these southern and eastern European immigrants found jobs in 
factories in the cities of the Northeast and Midwest, where Americans 
leaving the farm sometimes joined them. Third-wave immigration was 
slowed fi rst by World War I and then by quotas in the 1920s.
The fourth and current wave began with immigration reforms put 
in place in 1965. Since then, immigration has increased at an accelerat-
ing rate. The average annual infl ow of legal immigrants was 250,000 in 
the 1950s, 330,000 in the 1960s, 450,000 in the 1970s, 735,000 in the 
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1980s, and more than a million since the 1990s (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security 2009).
Types of Migrants
Foreigners enter the United States through a front door for legal 
permanent immigrants, a side door for legal temporary migrants, and 
a back door for unauthorized entrants. About two-thirds of legal im-
migrants are family sponsored, which means that family members in 
the United States asked the government to admit their relatives. There 
are no limits on the number of immigrant visas available for immedi-
ate relatives of U.S. citizens, and 580,000 were admitted in Fiscal Year 
2006, but there is a cap on the number of immigrant visas available to 
relatives of permanent residents and more distant relatives of U.S. citi-
zens (only 222,000 were admitted in 2006), resulting in long waits for 
visas. For example, Mexican spouses of U.S. immigrants had to wait 
six years for immigrant visas in 2008, and the wait for Mexican adult 
brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens was 13 years.16
Legal temporary migrants are foreigners who come to the United 
States to visit, work, or study. There are no limits on most types; the 
United States willingly accepted more than 30 million tourists and busi-
ness visitors in 2006. Temporary foreign students and workers are more 
controversial. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, the U.S. government required foreign students to be interviewed 
personally before receiving visas to study in the United States and to 
pay a fee to support a database that tracks them while they are studying 
in the states.
Guest workers receive visas that tie them to a U.S. employer and 
specify how long they can stay. Holders of H-1B visas have at least a 
college degree and fi ll a job that normally requires a college degree. 
Most H-1B guest workers are Indians employed in computer-related 
jobs. Each can stay up to six years and “adjust” to regular immigrant 
status if their U.S. employer deems them uniquely qualifi ed to fi ll the 
job.
It is easy for U.S. employers to have H-1B guest workers admitted; 
they simply attest that they are paying the prevailing wage and satisfy-
ing other conditions, and their request is almost automatically approved. 
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In 2001, Congress set an annual cap of 65,000 on the number of H-1B 
visas available to most employers, but there is no limit on the number 
for workers employed by nonprofi t organizations such as universities.
The number admitted on H-1B visas doubled from about 100,000 to 
200,000 in the 1990s and almost doubled again to just under 400,000 
in 2004, as Congress raised the cap temporarily at the request of high-
tech fi rms.17 Employers want far more than 65,000 H-1B visas to be 
available, and Microsoft founder Bill Gates has joined the chorus of 
those who say the cap should be eliminated entirely (McCullagh 2005). 
Critics of the H-1B program say that the easy availability of H-1B visas 
has discouraged Americans from studying and working in science and 
engineering fi elds (Teitelbaum 2003).
Unauthorized foreigners are persons in the country in violation of 
U.S. immigration laws. Demographer Jeff Passel estimated there were 
11 million unauthorized foreigners in 2005, with the number increasing 
by 525,000 a year (Passel 2006a). There were 37 million foreign-born 
U.S. residents in 2005, of which 31 percent were naturalized U.S. citi-
zens, 39 percent were legal immigrants and temporary visitors, and 30 
percent were unauthorized. Somewhat over half of the unauthorized 
foreigners entered the country by evading border controls, and the rest 
entered legally but did not leave as required (Passel 2006b).
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for 
preventing unauthorized foreigners from entering the nation and for 
fi nding and removing those here illegally. The department’s Customs 
and Border Protection agency includes the Border Patrol, which has 
more than 12,000 agents to apprehend foreigners attempting to enter 
the United States between designated ports of entry. In recent years, 
Border Patrol agents have been apprehending about 1.3 million for-
eigners a year, and 85 percent of these are Mexicans caught just inside 
the Mexico–U.S. border. In addition, some 208,500 foreigners were re-
moved or deported from the United States in 2005, 70 percent of which 
were Mexican.18
Economic Impacts
Most immigrants come to the United States for economic oppor-
tunity. As they go to work, immigrants affect the U.S. economy and 
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labor market. Most working-age immigrants fi nd jobs, earn and spend 
most of their wages, pay taxes, and consume public services. In do-
ing so, immigrants expand employment and the economy while slightly 
depressing wages or the growth in wages, especially for workers simi-
lar to the immigrants. With more workers, profi ts rise, and the entire 
economy is larger as a result of immigration.
In 1997, the National Research Council emphasized that the main 
benefi ciaries of immigration are the immigrants themselves, who earn 
higher wages than they could in their home countries, followed by 
their U.S. employers. Skilled U.S. workers and affl uent consumers also 
benefi t from the presence of unskilled immigrants, for example, when 
professionals hire migrants to do household work or pay slightly less 
in restaurants because migrants hold down wages. The net economic 
benefi ts of legal and illegal immigration were estimated to be $1 billion 
to $10 billion in the mid 1990s, meaning that U.S. gross domestic prod-
uct was increased by this amount because of immigration (Smith and 
Edmonston 1997). Proponents of immigration stress that the immigrant 
effect was positive; opponents stress that the overall impact was negli-
gible because the then $8 trillion economy was expanding by 3 percent, 
growing by $240 billion a year or by $10 billion every two weeks.19
Immigration has a small, yet positive overall economic effect, mak-
ing the major economic questions about immigration distributional, 
such as who benefi ts and who suffers from immigration? In general, im-
migrants are different from those born in the United States in their level 
of education, so they will have uneven effects on U.S.-born workers.
The best single predictor of U.S. income is years of education. 
Some 30 percent of immigrants who arrived since 1990 and were 25 or 
older in 2002 had at least a college degree, compared with 24 percent of 
U.S.-born Americans in the same age category. At the other end of the 
education distribution, 34 percent of the immigrants did not fi nish high 
school as compared with 16 percent of U.S.-born adults (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2005).
The differences between immigrants and those born in the United 
States are clear: the educational profi le of U.S.-born adults features a 
bulge in the middle, refl ecting the 62 percent of Americans with a high-
school diploma but no college degree. Immigrants, on the other hand, 
divide into three distinct groups of about equal size: college graduates, 
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high-school graduates, and those with less than a high-school diploma. 
The large share of immigrants with less than a high-school diploma 
has raised concerns about the impact of immigrants on low-skilled 
U.S. workers and about the balance of their taxes paid relative to tax-
supported benefi ts received.
LABOR-MARKET EFFECTS
Immigration adds workers who change U.S. wages, prices, and 
profi ts. The President’s Council of Economic Advisers summarized 
the labor-market effects of immigrants as follows: “Although immi-
grant workers increase output, their addition to the supply of labor . . . 
[causes] wage rates in the immediately affected market [to be] bid 
down . . . Thus, native-born workers who compete with immigrants for 
jobs may experience reduced earnings or reduced employment” (Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers 1986, p. 221).
Most research interest and policy concerns focus on how immigrants 
affect those near the bottom of the labor market. Governments have 
long protected vulnerable low-wage workers by establishing minimum 
wages, regulating hours of work, and allowing workers to join unions 
and bargain for higher wages with their employers. The 1960s War on 
Poverty and civil rights movement reinforced the U.S. commitment to 
improving conditions at the bottom of the labor market, which resulted 
in the creation of employment and training programs that enable work-
ers to improve their skills and earnings as well as affi rmative-action 
programs for groups that suffered discrimination in the past.
Economic Studies
Economists and other social scientists have used three kinds of stud-
ies to examine the labor-market effects of immigrants in detail: 1) case 
studies, 2) econometric studies, and 3) economic-mobility or integra-
tion studies.
Case studies examine the impacts of immigrants in a particular in-
dustry or occupation, not the overall economy. When unionized farm 
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workers in southern California went on strike for a wage increase in 
1982, many were replaced by unauthorized newcomers recruited to 
break the strike by labor contractors. The displacement of union work-
ers in this case was a result of a competition between employers. The 
unionized harvesting association lost business and laid off workers 
as growers turned to labor contractors who hired non-union and of-
ten unauthorized workers to get their lemons picked. Eventually, the 
unionized harvesting association went out of business, and the wages 
of lemon pickers declined (Mines and Martin 1984).
Case studies show that immigrants can displace workers and depress 
wages by adding vulnerable workers to the labor force. This scenario 
conforms to accepted labor-market theory, but as the lemon example 
shows, immigration’s effects on wages and employment can be indirect 
and thus hard to measure. One reason is that many workers are hired via 
networks, meaning that current workers bring friends and family to fi ll 
vacant jobs. Once a cross-border network takes over the recruitment of 
new workers to fi ll job vacancies in a particular workplace, local work-
ers may not learn about them as immigrants recruit new workers from 
abroad. An example of network hiring via contractors was when the 
owners of offi ce buildings in Los Angeles replaced unionized black jan-
itors with immigrants hired through cleaning contractors in the 1980s 
and 1990s (General Accounting Offi ce 1988, pp. 39–41).
Other case studies show how an industry can introduce immigrants 
to an area via recruitment networks. The U.S. meat industry employs 
about 500,000 workers to turn cattle, hogs, sheep, and poultry into meat 
and other products, and it has shifted from cities such as Chicago to 
more rural areas in the Midwest and Southeast over the past quarter 
century. Plants became fewer and larger, and they often sought to oper-
ate 16 hours a day with two “disassembly” shifts in areas with relatively 
few workers, and wages were much lower than those paid in cities, 
where workers had other job options. Many of these plants recruited 
immigrants, and today about half of the workers in meatpacking are 
Hispanic (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2008).
Case studies emphasize how contractor recruitment, networks, and 
industry shifts interact to transform particular workplaces or industries, 
whereas econometric studies consider how immigration, wages, and 
employment interact in a city’s labor market, usually by comparing cit-
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ies with higher and lower shares of immigrant workers. Econometric 
studies begin with the assumption that, if the presence of immigrants 
depresses wages or displaces workers, cities with a higher share of 
immigrants in their labor forces should have lower wages or higher 
unemployment rates, especially for similar U.S. workers. Thus, econo-
metric studies typically compare wages and unemployment rates for 
blacks, Hispanics, and women in cities with relatively more and fewer 
immigrants, such as Los Angeles and Minneapolis, expecting to fi nd 
lower wages or higher unemployment in the area with more immigrants 
(Los Angeles in this example).
During the 1980s, to the surprise of economists, econometric stud-
ies found few of these expected negative labor-market effects. For 
example, a comparison of the wages and unemployment rates of black 
workers in Miami and other cities such as Atlanta and Tampa found no 
signifi cant differences, even though the 1980 Mariel boatlift increased 
the Miami labor force by 7 percent in just four months (Card 1990). 
Several reasons for fi nding no adverse effects were offered, includ-
ing the fact that jobs were created to build housing for the newcomers 
and that Cuban newcomers and local blacks did not compete for the 
same jobs; for example, few Cuban newcomers got government jobs. 
Economist George Borjas summarized the 1980s research literature by 
concluding, “Modern econometrics cannot detect a single shred of evi-
dence that immigrants have a sizable adverse impact on the earnings 
and employment opportunities of natives in the United States” (Borjas 
1990, p. 81).
As more data became available in the 1990s, researchers began to 
realize that, instead of staying in “immigrant cities,” U.S. workers who 
competed most directly with immigrants moved away from immigrant 
cities or did not move to them. As a result, the effects of immigration on 
wages or unemployment were quickly diffused throughout the country 
rather than being measurable in an immigrant city such as Los Ange-
les or Houston. Furthermore, the “similar U.S. workers” who remained 
in “immigrant cities” often did not compete directly with immigrant 
workers, such as when blacks and women worked for government 
agencies at wages negotiated by collective bargaining or set by federal, 
state, or local governments that did not respond immediately to an in-
fl ux of immigrant workers. If some of the U.S. workers who compete 
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with newcomer immigrants move away, and the workers who remain 
are sheltered from immigrant wage effects, it is very hard to detect the 
expected effects of immigrants in comparisons of city labor markets 
(Borjas 1994a, 1999).
Measuring the impacts of 22 million foreign-born workers on 127 
million U.S.-born workers is no easier when foreign-born workers dif-
fer signifi cantly in education and location. The expected labor-market 
effects of adding immigrants to the labor force—slower wage growth 
and higher unemployment among similar workers—tend to be small 
and very hard to measure, especially because U.S. residents are mobile 
and labor markets are fl exible. Indeed, if immigrants move to fast-
growing cities, city comparison studies may suggest that immigration 
benefi ts similar U.S. workers (Borjas and Katz 2005). The diffi culty in 
measuring immigrant impacts, and the different conclusions reached by 
economists such as George Borjas, who believes that immigrants re-
duce the wages of similar U.S. workers, and David Card, who does not, 
ensures a continuing debate on their effects (Lowenstein 2006).
Economic-mobility or integration studies examine how immigrants 
and their children are faring in the United States. Immigrants earn just 
over 75 percent as much as U.S.-born workers. In 2007, their median 
weekly earnings were $554 versus $722 for U.S.-born workers (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2008). Lower earnings for newcomers who may 
not know English or have U.S. work experience are not surprising; the 
question is whether the earnings of immigrants catch up to those of 
U.S.-born workers over time, suggesting economic integration.
Economist Barry Chiswick studied the earnings trajectories of im-
migrant men who were in the United States in 1970. Chiswick found 
that the earnings of immigrant men were initially 10 percent lower than 
those of U.S.-born men of similar age and level of education. However, 
the earnings of immigrant men rose faster, and after an average 13 years 
in the United States, they had earnings equal to those of similar U.S.-
born men, and after 23 years, the immigrants earned 6 percent more 
(Chiswick 1978). Chiswick’s study provided evidence for the fresh-
blood argument that immigration benefi ts the United States because the 
extra drive and ambition that leads people to cross national borders and 
begin anew expands the U.S. economy and raises average earnings.
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A decade later, economist George Borjas concluded that Chiswick’s 
fi ndings applied to a unique set of circumstances. Most of the immi-
grants in the United States in 1970 were Europeans or well-educated 
Asians who initially earned less than comparably educated U.S. men, 
but they caught up as they learned English and gained U.S. work expe-
rience. However, later cohorts of immigrants who arrived with far less 
education, such as legal and unauthorized Mexican immigrants, started 
their American journeys with much lower earnings than earlier immi-
grants. The earnings of Mexicans did not rise as fast, leading Borjas 
to conclude that continued Latin American immigration would lead to 
widening gaps between immigrants and native-born Americans (Borjas 
1994b).20
Entrepreneurship
Economists tend to look at earnings to measure economic inte-
gration, but some social scientists emphasize other indicators, such as 
entrepreneurship and the creation of new businesses. Immigrant-owned 
businesses are highly visible in many cities, from ethnic restaurants and 
shops to gardening and cleaning services. With immigrants often will-
ing to work long hours, sometimes creating jobs for family members 
and other immigrants from their countries of origin, some commenta-
tors say that immigrant energy can revitalize cities (Aronson 1997, pp. 
11–12; Portes 1995, p. 29). Many Cubans in Miami, for example, began 
businesses to serve other Cubans in an “ethnic enclave” that is now seen 
as an economic incubator (Portes and Bach 1985).
Entrepreneurship is hard to measure, and self-employment is often 
used as a proxy measure for those who begin their own businesses. 
About 13 percent of U.S.-born workers were self-employed in 2005 (a 
broad category including, for example, farmers, doctors, and lawyers), 
as were 11 percent of foreign-born workers. Rates of self-employment 
were especially high among some groups: 28 percent of those born in 
Korea were self-employed in the United States, as were 20 percent or 
more of those born in Russia and Iran (Camarota 2005). Self-employment 
normally declines with economic development, especially as farmers 
leave the land for urban jobs in factories and offi ces. However, in the 
new service economy, it has become easier to be self-employed, and 
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immigrants may be in a unique position to spot opportunities (Camarota 
2005).
In the end, though, it is not clear that self-employment is a sign of 
immigrant economic success. In fact, self-employment tends to increase 
during recessions, as some ex-farmers return to the land in developing 
countries and some laid-off executives become self-employed consul-
tants in more developed countries (Borjas 1990; Filer, Hamermesh, and 
Rees 1996).
IMMIGRATION TRADE-OFFS
Immigration is often characterized as either good or bad for the 
country, but public policy choices are rarely contests between good and 
bad. They are instead arguments about which “good” deserves higher 
priority. For example, raising interest rates can lead to lower infl ation, a 
desirable result, but away from fuller employment, a competing good. 
Similarly, reducing trade barriers can stimulate exports, helping some 
employers and workers, but it also increases imports, which can lead to 
the failure of other businesses and a loss of jobs.
There is no easy way to balance the trade-offs between competing 
outcomes, and the United States has found it especially hard to deal 
with trade-offs inherent in the three basic immigration questions:
1) How many immigrants should be allowed to enter?
2) From which countries and in what status should they come?
3) How should the government enforce immigration rules?
Immigrant farm workers provide an example. Americans want to 
pay low prices for food. They also want farm workers, like other U.S. 
workers, to have decent wages and working conditions. Congress per-
mitted Mexican farm workers to enter as immigrants and guest workers 
and tolerated unauthorized migrants, which helped to keep farm wages 
low but also increased poverty among farm workers. To alleviate this 
poverty, the federal government spends about $1 billion a year on spe-
cial education, health, and housing programs for farm workers and their 
children.21
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What is the trade-off between cheap food and decent farm wages? 
According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expen-
diture Survey, there were 120 million “consumer units” in 2007, and 
they had an average of 2.5 persons, 1.3 earners, and 1.9 vehicles. These 
consumer units or households had average annual incomes of $63,100 
before taxes, and their expenditures averaged $49,600 (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2008). These household expenditures included $6,100 
for food (12 percent). Food spending was split 57–43 percent, including 
$3,500 for food eaten at home ($67 a week) and $2,700 for food bought 
away from home. To put food spending in perspective, other signifi cant 
expenditures were $17,000 for housing and utilities, $8,800 for trans-
portation, $2,900 for health care, $1,900 for apparel, and $2,700 for 
entertainment (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008).
The largest at-home food expenditures were for meat and poultry, 
totaling $777. Expenditures on cereal and bakery products, $460, ex-
ceeded the $387 spent on dairy products. Expenditures on fresh fruits 
($202) and fresh vegetables ($190) totaled $392, or $7.50 a week (con-
sumer units spent an additional $112 on processed fruits and $96 on 
processed vegetables). The average consumer unit spent more on al-
coholic beverages, $457 (or $8.75 a week), than on fresh fruits and 
vegetables (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2008).
Farmers get a small share of the retail food dollar, an average of 19 
percent. In 2006, farmers received an average 30 percent of the retail 
price of fresh fruits and 25 percent of the retail price of fresh vegetables, 
so consumer expenditures of $392 meant $109 to the farmer ([0.3 × 
$202 = $61] + [0.25 × $190 = $48] = $109). Farm labor costs are typi-
cally less than a third of farm revenue for fresh fruits and vegetables, 
meaning that farm worker wages and benefi ts for fresh fruits and veg-
etables cost the average consumer unit $36 a year (U.S Department of 
Agriculture 2008a).
Although strawberries are picked directly into the containers in 
which they are sold, and iceberg lettuce gets its fi lm wrapper in the 
fi eld, farmers and farm workers get a very small share of the retail dol-
lar. Consumers who pay $1 for a pound of apples are giving 30 cents to 
the farmer of which 10 cents goes to the farm worker; those spending 
$2 for a head of lettuce are giving 42 cents to the farmer and 10 cents to 
the farm worker (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008a).
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If the infl ux of immigrant workers was slowed or stopped and farm 
wages rose, what would happen to expenditures on fresh fruits and 
vegetables? In 1966, the fl edgling United Farm Workers union won a 
40 percent wage increase for table grape harvesters, largely because 
Bracero workers (temporary contract laborers from Mexico) were not 
available. The average earnings of fi eld workers were $9.40 an hour in 
2007, according to a U.S. Department of Agriculture survey of farm 
employers, and a 40 percent increase would raise the average to $13.15 
an hour. If this wage increase were passed on to consumers, the 10-cent 
farm labor cost of a pound of apples would rise to 14 cents, and the re-
tail price would rise to $1.04 (U.S. Department of Agriculture 2008b).
For a typical household, a 40 percent increase in farm labor costs 
translates into about a 4 percent (3.6 percent) increase in retail prices 
for fresh fruits and vegetables.22 If farm wages rose 40 percent and were 
passed fully to consumers, average spending on fruits and vegetables 
would rise by $14 a year (3.6 percent × $392). However, for a typical 
seasonal farm worker, a 40 percent wage increase could raise earnings 
from $9,400 for 1,000 hours of work to $13,150, lifting him or her 
above the federal poverty line for an individual.
Are the savings on fresh produce due to immigration worthwhile? 
Under the present arrangement, the migrants are better off, earning 
more in the United States than they would at home. U.S. farmers and 
their bankers are also better off, enjoying higher profi ts and higher land 
prices. Consumers of U.S. commodities pay less for fresh produce. The 
critical question is whether these benefi ts are more valuable than having 
farm work performed and rewarded like other work in America. The 
way this question is answered affects U.S. immigration policy, espe-
cially with respect to Mexico.
CONCLUSIONS: IMMIGRATION AND VERNON BRIGGS
Immigration means change—in the number and type of people and 
workers in a country, in the structure and functioning of labor markets, 
and in the welfare of residents and workers. Migration has interrelated 
cultural and political as well as economic dimensions, as demonstrated 
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by this chapter’s discussion of recruiting networks and migration man-
agement. At the same time, the economic and labor-market effects of 
migrants are often diffi cult to measure, which prompts some to con-
clude that there are few such effects.
Vernon Briggs has long been concerned about low-wage and mi-
nority workers. His scholarship demonstrates that periods of low 
immigration and rapid economic growth, such as the 1960s, reinforce 
governmental poverty-reduction efforts and enable a rising tide to lift 
most U.S. workers up the U.S. job ladder (Briggs 2003). His work also 
documents that unauthorized migration surged in the 1990s, in part 
a consequence of fl awed policy initiatives, as the real wages of U.S. 
workers with little education and few skills declined, even as their share 
of the labor force diminished (Briggs 2005).
Briggs deserves our gratitude for pioneering efforts to analyze these 
trends and to educate and inform policymakers and the public about 
the links between increased immigration and low-wage workers. The 
unauthorized foreigners who arrived in the 1990s are having U.S.-born 
(and thus U.S.-citizen) children, and a future Vernon Briggs will likely 
develop policy options to help them climb the U.S. job ladder.
Notes
1. Charles C. Lemert says there were fewer than 50 nation-states in 1900 (Lemert 
2005, p. 176).
2. Data were obtained from the Web sites of government immigration agencies that 
were accessed in August 2007.
3. A Wall Street Journal editorial on July 3, 1986, fi rst made the open borders pro-
posal, which was repeated in an editorial on July 3, 1990.
4. The National Front candidate, Jean Marie Le Pen, received 15 percent of the vote 
in the fi rst round of presidential voting in 1995 (Fekete 1995).
5. The average woman in developing countries has 3.5 children (excluding China), 
versus 1.5 children per woman in developed countries. According to the Population 
Reference Bureau (http://www.prb.org), the world’s fastest growing population is 
in Gaza, where the population growth rate is 4.5 percent a year, and the fastest 
shrinking population is in Russia, where the population is declining by 0.5 percent 
a year.
6. Young people are most likely to move over borders because they have the least 
invested in jobs and careers at home and the most time to recoup their “investment 
in migration” abroad.
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7. Average global per-capita income was $7,000 per person. At purchasing power 
parity, which takes into account national differences in the cost of living, the 
world’s gross national income was $56 trillion or $9,400 per capita—$32,500 per 
capita in the high-income countries and $5,200 in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (World Bank 2009).
8. Taxes are extracted from agriculture by monopoly input suppliers who sell seeds 
or fertilizers at high prices or by monopoly purchasers of farm commodities who 
buy from farmers at less-than-world prices and pocket the difference when the 
coffee, cocoa, or other commodity is exported. In high-income countries, farmers’ 
incomes are generally higher than those of nonfarmers, in part because high-
income countries transfer funds to producers of food and fi ber.
9. For example, this is evident in Chinese coastal cities, where internal rural–urban 
migrants fi ll 3-D jobs, and abroad, where Chinese migrants are employed in indus-
tries that range from services to sweatshops (Migration News 2008).
10. These farm worker recruitment networks are examined in Rural Migration News. 
See http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/index.php.
11. Even if migrants know that movies and TV shows portray exaggerated lifestyles, 
migrants who fi nd themselves in slave-like conditions abroad sometimes say they 
did not believe things in rich countries could be “that bad.”
12. The goal is to prevent so-called asylum shopping, such as when an asylum seeker 
from Turkey passes through Bulgaria and Romania en route to Germany and ap-
plies for asylum because conditions for asylum applicants and rates of recognition 
are better in Germany (Da Lomba 2004).
13. A federal judge stopped implementation of Proposition 187 (which was approved 
by a 59 to 41 percent margin in November 1994), but some of its provisions were 
included in 1996 federal immigration reforms (see Migration News 1994).
14. Details of the three U.S. laws enacted in 1996 can be found at Migration News 
(http://migration.ucdavis.edu). One provision that was eventually dropped would 
have made legal immigrants deportable if they received more than 12 months of 
welfare benefi ts.
15. The exceptions are Native Americans, slaves, and those who became U.S. citizens 
by purchase or conquest, such as French nationals who became Americans with 
the Louisiana Purchase, Mexicans who became Americans with the settlement 
ending the Mexican War, and Puerto Ricans who became U.S. citizens as a result 
of the American victory over Spain in 1898.
16. Waiting lists are published in the Department of State Visa Bulletin, available at 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_1360.html.
17. In addition to the H-1B cap exemption for certain nonprofi ts, up to 20,000 foreign 
students a year who earn master’s degrees and doctorates from U.S. universi-
ties can receive H-1B visas. As a result, the number admitted each year exceeds 
100,000. An H-1B visa holder can later become an immigrant if he or she qualifi es 
on the basis of family unifi cation or employment.
18. Annual DHS reports entitled “Immigration Enforcement Actions” can be found at 
http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/publications/index.shtm. Almost all appre-
hended Mexicans “volunteer” to return to Mexico. Those caught so many times 
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they appear to be smugglers may be prosecuted by U.S. authorities. In the inves-
tigation of the fi rings of eight U.S. attorneys in December 2006, it was reported 
that, in most border districts, the same individual had to be apprehended at least 
six times before being prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s offi ce (see Migration 
News 2007b).
19. By 2005, the U.S. economy was growing by about $15 billion in two weeks.
20. Between 1970 and 1990, the share of U.S. men without a high-school diploma by 
age 25 fell from 40 percent to 15 percent; the share of immigrant men without a 
high-school diploma fell from 48 percent to 37 percent (Borjas 1994b).
21. The evolution and effectiveness of these programs is examined in Martin and
Martin (1993).
22. The calculation is as follows. If farmers receive an average 27.8 percent of the 
retail price of fresh fruits and vegetables ($109/$392), and give a third of what they 
get to farm workers, then the farm worker share of the retail dollar is 9 percent 
(0.278 × 0.33 = 9 percent). If farm labor costs rise 40 percent, then 0.4 × 9 percent 
yields a 3.6 percent rise in retail prices.
References
Aronson, David. 1997. “Immigrant Entrepreneurs.” Research Perspectives on 
Migration 1(2): 1–15.
Borjas, George J. 1990. Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the 
U.S. Economy. New York: Basic Books.
———. 1994a. “The Economics of Immigration.” Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 32(4): 1667–1717.
———. 1994b. “Assimilation and Changes in Cohort Quality Revisited: What 
Happened to Immigrant Earnings in the 1980s?” NBER Working Paper no. 
4866. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
———. 1999. “The Economic Analysis of Immigration.” In Handbook of La-
bor Economics, Volume 3A, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds. Am-
sterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1697–1760.
Borjas, George J., and Lawrence F. Katz. 2005. “The Evolution of the Mexican-
Born Workforce in the United States.” NBER Working Paper no. 11281. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Briggs, Vernon. 2003. Mass Immigration and the National Interest: Policy Di-
rections for the New Century. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
———. 2005. “Immigration and Poverty Reduction: Policy Making on a 
Squirrel Wheel.” Journal of Economic Issues 37(2): 325–332.
Camarota, Steven A. 2005. Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of Ameri-
ca’s Foreign-Born Population in 2005. Washington, DC: Center for Immi-
Immigration and the U.S. Labor Market   75
gration Studies. http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back1405.html (accessed 
January 31, 2009).
Card, David. 1990. “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor 
Market.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43(2): 245–257.
Chiswick, Barry. 1978. “The Effect of Americanization on the Earnings of
Foreign-Born Men.” Journal of Political Economy 86(5): 897–921.
Council of Economic Advisers. 1986. “The Economic Effects of Immigra-
tion.” In Economic Report of the President, 1986. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Offi ce, pp. 213–234.
Da Lomba, Sylvie. 2004. The Right to Seek Refugee Status in the European 
Union. Antwerp: Intersentia.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 2008. Job Patterns for Mi-
norities and Women in Private Industry (EEO-1). Washington, DC: Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission. http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/
jobpat.html (accessed January 31, 2009).
Fekete, Liz. 1995. “Issues in the French Presidential Elections.” Independent 
Race and Refugee News Network news release, June 1. http://www.irr.org
.uk/europebulletin/france/extreme_right_politics/1995/ak000006.html (ac-
cessed January 31, 2009).
Filer, Randall, Daniel Hamermesh, and Albert Rees. 1996. The Economics of 
Work and Pay. New York: HarperCollins.
General Accounting Offi ce. 1988. Illegal Aliens: Infl uence of Illegal Workers 
on the Wages and Working Conditions of Legal Workers. PEMD-88-13BR. 
Washington, DC: General Accounting Offi ce.
International Labour Offi ce. 2009. Total and Economically Active Population, 
Employment and Unemployment (Population Censuses). Geneva: Interna-
tional Labour Offi ce. http://laborsta.ilo.org/applv8/data/SSM5/E/ssm5.html 
(accessed September 20, 2009).
Lemert, Charles C. 2005. Social Things: An Introduction to the Sociological 
Life. New York: Rowman and Littlefi eld.
Lowenstein, Roger. 2006. “The Immigration Equation.” New York Times 
Magazine, July 9, pp. 36–43, 69–71. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/
magazine/09IMM.html (accessed January 31, 2009).
Martin, Philip L. 1996. Promises to Keep: Collective Bargaining in California 
Agriculture. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press.
Martin, Philip L., and David Martin. 1993. The Endless Quest: Helping Amer-
ica’s Farm Workers. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Martin, Philip L., and Elizabeth Midgley. 2006. “Immigration: Shaping and 
Reshaping America.” Population Bulletin 61(4): 3–28.
McCullagh, Declan. 2005. “Gates Wants to Scrap H-1B Visa Restrictions.” 
76   Martin
ZDNet News and Blogs, April 27. http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_
22-142533.html (accessed January 31, 2009).
Migration News. 1994. “Prop. 187 Approved in California.” Migration News 
0(4). http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=492_0_2_0 (accessed 
January 31, 2009).
———. 2006. “Senate Approves CIRA.” Migration News 12(3). http://
migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3199_0_2_0.July (accessed June 
3, 2009).
———. 2007a. “Senate: Immigration Reform Stalls.” Migration News 13(3). 
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more_entireissue.php?idate=2007_
07&number=3.July (accessed June 3, 2009).
———. 2007b. “DHS: Border, Interior.” Migration News 13(2). http://
migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3272_0_2_0 (accessed January 
31, 2009).
———. 2008. “China: Migrants, Taiwan.” Migration News 14(2). http://
migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=3353_0_3_0 (accessed June 3, 
2009).
Mines, Richard, and Philip L. Martin. 1984. “Immigrant Workers and the Cali-
fornia Citrus Industry.” Industrial Relations 23(1): 139–149.
Passel, Jeff. 2006a. “Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Pop-
ulation in the United States: Estimates Based on the March 2005 Current 
Population Survey.” Research report. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic Cen-
ter. http://pewhispanic.org/fi les/reports/61.pdf (accessed June 26, 2009).
———. 2006b. “Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population.” 
Pew Hispanic Center Fact Sheet no. 19. Washington, DC: Pew Hispanic 
Center. http://pewhispanic.org/fi les/factsheets/19.pdf (accessed June 26, 
2009).
Portes, Alejandro, ed. 1995. The Economic Sociology of Immigration. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Portes, Alejandro, and Robert L. Bach. 1985. Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexi-
can Immigrants in the United States. Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press.
Ruhs, Martin, and Philip L. Martin. 2008. “Numbers vs. Rights: Trade-offs and 
Guest Worker Programs.” International Migration Review 42(1): 249–265.
Rural Migration News. n.d. Various issues. http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/
index.php (accessed January 31, 2009).
Smith, James P., and Barry Edmonston. 1997. The New Americans: Economic, 
Demographic and Fiscal Effects of Immigration. Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press.
Teitelbaum, Michael S. 2003. “Do We Need More Scientists?” Public Interest 
no. 153, 40–53.
Immigration and the U.S. Labor Market   77
Torpey, John. 1999. The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship 
and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
United Nations Population Division. 1999. The World at Six Billion. New 
York: United Nations.
———. 2006. International Migration Report 2005. ST/ESA/SER.A/220. 
New York: United Nations. http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/
2006Migration_Chart/2006IttMig_chart.htm (accessed January 31, 2009).
United Nations Population Fund. 2007. State of World Population 2007. New 
York: United Nations Population Fund. http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2007/
english/introduction.html (accessed January 31, 2009).
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2008. Consumer Expenditure Survey. Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. http://www.bls.gov/cex/ (ac-
cessed January 31, 2009).
U.S. Census Bureau. 2005. Educational Attainment in the United States: 
2005. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/
population/www/socdemo/education/cps2005.html (accessed June 26, 
2009).
U.S. Department of Agriculture. 2008a. Price Spreads from Farm to Consumer. 
Washington, DC: Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture. http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FarmToConsumer/index.htm (accessed 
June 26, 2009).
———. 2008b. NASS Farm Labor. Washington, DC: National Agricul-
tural Statistics Service. http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/
viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1063 (accessed January 31, 2009).
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2009. Immigration Statistics. Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. http://www.dhs.gov/
immigrationstatistics (accessed June 3, 2009).
U.S. Department of Labor. 2008. Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Charac-
teristics in 2007. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor. http://www
.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf (accessed January 31, 2009).
World Bank. 2009. Key Development Data and Statistics. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
D ATA S TAT I S T I C S / 0 , , c o n t e n t M D K : 2 0 5 3 5 2 8 5 ~ m e n u P K :
1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html 
(accessed June 3, 2009).
Human Resource 
Economics and Public Policy
Essays in Honor of 




W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Human resource economics and public policy : essays in honor of Vernon M. Briggs Jr. 
/ Charles Whalen, editor.
  p. cm.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-359-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-359-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-361-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-361-8 (hardcover : alk. paper) 
 1. Labor economics. 2. Manpower policy. I. Briggs, Vernon M. II. Whalen, Charles J.,  
 1960- HD4901.H83 2010
 331—dc22
2009041858
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Ace Creative, LLC.
Index prepared by Diane Worden.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
